Myth of the strongman

Prashant Jha

Ever since the peace process began, one of the major pre-occupations of the non-Maoist politicians has been pushing the thesis that Maoists are out to “capture the state”; that this is a tactical interlude and their ambition of establishing a one-party dictatorship remains. To strengthen their case, the opponents of the Maoists often over-estimated the Maoist strength and projected it as not only having the intention, but the capacity to achieve their goal. The Maoists provided ammunition to this narrative when they flirted with the notion of a “People’s Federal Republic”, instead of the commonly agreed upon “Federal Democratic Republic”. In government, Maoist leaders often remarked they have the sarkar, but not the satta—giving rise to suspicions that they were intolerant of institutions that had to operate by the rulebook.

But despite the rhetoric of both sides, it was clear to any observer who cared to look at the facts on the ground that “state capture” was a myth. The opposition was using it, after the Maoist electoral victory in 2008, to stoke fears, build up a coalition antagonistic to the Maoists, and expand their political space. In the absence of any other agenda, NC and UML adopted the rhetorical device of “state capture” and “democracy-protection”.

For the Maoists, the revolutionary rhetoric was useful in keeping their indoctrinated cadre together, despite the leadership knowing the limits of their power. This lie was to come back to haunt the leadership when the workers got increasingly frustrated at the absence of “change”, and eventually a section split. A more accurate reading of the Maoist political aim would be that they sought to establish a degree of political control by doing what previous regimes had done.

This included packing in their own people in the bureaucracy and security organs (the influx of NC loyalists into the police in the 90s, and UML’s into the lower bureaucracy being examples), taking populist steps, and appointing party sympathisers to key government posts.

The fact that they were over-ambitious and reckless in this enterprise, opened up multiple fronts, and used the rhetoric of communism, proved to be their undoing.

For precisely the same reasons that the Maoists had to give up the gun and enter open politics—an army which did not allow them to capture Kathmandu; an international climate, which would not allow an absolute Maoist takeover; and a complex domestic balance of power where other social groups had the levers of power and could not be “eliminated”—they would not be able to establish “dictatorship”. When rivals perceived a rising Maoist threat, these forces—NC, UML, Nepal Army (NA), and India—came together to isolate, weaken and tire the Maoists out and moderate their instincts. 

That phase is over in Nepali politics. The Maoists have given up their revolutionary rhetoric which they used to appease their indoctrinated cadre base; even at the cost of a party split, Prachanda has not deviated from the democratic politics line. They have had to give up the PLA, through a process that has left many combatants angry and disillusioned. They have not only participated in the polls, but also parliamentary processes to get elected and pass legislation. They had to respect existing institutional norms, including of the NA, with which they fought not too long ago as witnessed in the recent appointment of the new army chief. If anything, the criticism that can be made about the Maoists is that they are too comfortably enmeshed in the existing political-economic networks, to the extent that they replicate the same political culture they once criticised.

Public memory is short, but politicians have deep memories. NC and UML netas surely remember their key success of the past five years—the manner in which they have “democratised”, others would say “tamed” and “corrupted”, the Maoists. Which is why it is intriguing to read and hear about the opposition’s new fears about Baburam Bhattarai becoming a strongman. One cannot but entertain the suspicion that this is only a rhetorical ploy to stoke paranoia against the Maoists in a bid to build a wider coalition, and hide their own political misjudgments.

The reason why this does not appear to be a sincere apprehension is that if anything, this is a remarkably weak government. Let alone establishing a dictatorship, over the past year, executive authority in Nepal has eroded significantly, decision-making has become increasingly constrained by extraneous circumstances, the political theatre has become further fragmented, and the idea of collective responsibility has been thrown into the dustbin with cabinet ministers running fiefdoms.

Here is a caretaker PM who could not get a full budget; who has to depend on the President’s goodwill to pass any ordinance; whose executive decisions have been revoked by the SC time and again; who could not get key financial legislations (necessary to meet international obligations) passed because of opposition from within his own party; who had to sack one of his key loyalist ministers, Prabhu Sah, because of a strong campaign by the opposition and the media; who could not even get the Army Road opened in Kathmandu due to concerns expressed by the NA; whose writ does not extend to ministries under the control of other parties; who has to fight constant battles against his party chairman; whose public credibility has diminished drastically; who has to face an increasingly critical and hostile media on a range of issues; and whose key challenge is to merely survive.

And this PM, we are to believe, will become a “strongman”. Baburam Bhattarai’s tenacity, and correct decision not to resign without a package deal, has worked, with the opposition now relenting and returning to the dialogue

table. But to extrapolate that to project him as a potential hegemonic ruler is a bit rich. Instead of creating the baseless bogey of the coming dictatorship, Nepal’s political class should think about the dysfunctional anarchy of our system, and ways to establish a degree of political order, within a federal and democratic polity.